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Abstract
This note makes the obvious observation that Hoeffding’s original
proof of his inequality remains valid in the game-theoretic framework.
All details are spelled out for the convenience of future reference.
1 Introduction
The game-theoretic approach to probability was started by von Mises and
greatly advanced by Ville [5]; however, it has been overshadowed by Kol-
mogorov’s measure-theoretic approach [3]. The relatively recent book [4] con-
tains game-theoretic versions of several results of probability theory, and it
argues that the game-theoretic versions have important advantages over the
conventional measure-theoretic versions. However, [4] does not contain any
large-deviation inequalities. This note fills the gap by stating the game-theoretic
version of Hoeffding’s inequality ([2], Theorem 2).
2 Hoeffding’s supermartingale
This section presents perhaps the most useful product of Hoeffding’s method, a
non-negative supermartingale starting from 1. This supermartingale will easily
yield Hoeffding’s inequality in the following section.
This is a version of the basic forecasting protocol from [4]:
Game of forecasting bounded variables
Players: Sceptic, Forecaster, Reality
Protocol:
Sceptic announces K0 ∈ R.
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Forecaster announces interval [an, bn] ⊆ R and number µn ∈ (a, b).
1
Sceptic announces Mn ∈ R.
Reality announces xn ∈ [an, bn].
Sceptic announces Kn ≤ Kn−1 +Mn(xn − µn).
On each round n of the game Forecaster outputs an interval [an, bn] which, in his
opinion, will cover the actual observation xn to be chosen by Reality, and also
outputs his expectation µn for xn. The forecasts are being tested by Sceptic,
who is allowed to gamble against them. The expectation µn is interpreted as
the price of a ticket which pays xn after Reality’s move becomes known; Sceptic
is allowed to buy any number Mn, positive, zero, or negative, of such tickets.
When xn falls outside [an, bn], Sceptic becomes infinitely rich; without loss of
generality we include the requirement xn ∈ [an, bn] in the protocol; furthermore,
we will always assume that µn ∈ (an, bn). Sceptic is allowed to choose his initial
capital K0 and is allowed to throw away part of his money at the end of each
round.
It is important that the game of forecasting bounded variables is a perfect-
information game: each player can see the other players’ moves before making
his or her (Forecaster and Sceptic are male and Reality is female) own move;
there is no randomness in the protocol.
A process is a real-valued function defined on all finite sequences
(a1, b1, µ1, x1, . . . , aN , bN , µN , xN ), N = 0, 1, . . ., of Forecaster’s and Real-
ity’s moves in the game of forecasting bounded variables. If we fix a strategy for
Sceptic, Sceptic’s capital KN , N = 0, 1, . . ., become a function of Forecaster’s
and Reality’s previous moves; in other words, Sceptic’s capital becomes a pro-
cess. The processes that can be obtained this way are called (game-theoretic)
supermartingales.
The following theorem is essentially inequality (4.16) in [2].
Theorem 1 For any h ∈ R, the process
N∏
n=1
exp
(
h(xn − µn)−
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
is a supermartingale.
Proof Assume, without loss of generality, that Forecaster is additionally re-
quired to always set µn := 0. (Adding the same constant to an, bn, and µn will
not change anything for Sceptic.) Now we have an < 0 < bn.
It suffices to prove that on round n Sceptic can make a capital of K into a
capital of at least
K exp
(
hxn −
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
;
in other words, that he can obtain a payoff of at least
exp
(
hxn −
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
− 1
2
using the available tickets (paying xn and costing 0). This will follow from the
inequality
exp
(
hxn −
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
− 1 ≤ xn
ehbn − ehan
bn − an
exp
(
−
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
,
which can be rewritten as
exp (hxn) ≤ exp
(
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
+ xn
ehbn − ehan
bn − an
. (1)
Our goal is to prove (1). By the convexity of the function exp, it suffices to
prove
xn − an
bn − an
ehbn +
bn − xn
bn − an
ehan ≤ exp
(
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
+ xn
ehbn − ehan
bn − an
,
i.e.,
bne
han − ane
hbn
bn − an
≤ exp
(
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
,
i.e.,
ln
(
bne
han − ane
hbn
)
≤
h2
8
(bn − an)
2 + ln(bn − an). (2)
The derivative of the left-hand side of (2) is
anbne
han − anbne
hbn
bnehan − anehbn
and the second derivative, after cancellations and regrouping, is
(bn − an)
2
(
bne
han
) (
−ane
hbn
)
(bnehan − anehbn)
2
.
The last ratio is of the form u(1−u) where 0 < u < 1. Hence it does not exceed
1/4, and the second derivative itself does not exceed (bn − an)
2/4. Inequality
(2) now follows from the second-order Taylor expansion of the left-hand side
around h = 0.
The relation between the game-theoretic and measure-theoretic approaches
to probability is described in [4], Chapter 8. Intuitively, the generality of the
game-theoretic protocol stems from the fact that Forecaster is not asked to pro-
duce a full-blown probability forecast for xn: only the elements (an, bn, µn) that
we really need for our mathematical result enter the game of forecasting bounded
variables. Besides, the players are allowed to react to each other moves; in par-
ticular, Reality may react to Forecaster’s moves and both Reality and Forecaster
may react to Sceptic’s moves (the latter is important in applications to defensive
forecasting: see, e.g., [6]). It is remarkable that many measure-theoretic proofs
carry over in a straightforward manner to game-theoretic probability.
3
3 Hoeffding’s inequality
We start from the definition of upper probability, a game-theoretic counter-
part (along with lower probability) of the standard measure-theoretic notion of
probability. Suppose the game of forecasting bounded variables lasts a known
number N of rounds. (See [4] for the general definition.) The sample space is
the set of all sequences (a1, b1, µ1, x1, . . . , aN , bN , µN , xN ) of Forecaster’s and
Reality’s moves in the game. An event is a subset of the sample space. The up-
per probability of an event E is the infimum of the initial value of non-negative
supermartingales that take value at least 1 on E. (See [4], Chapter 8, for a
demonstration that this definition agrees with measure-theoretic probability.)
Theorem 1 immediately gives Hoeffding’s inequality (cf. [2], the proof of
Theorem 2) when combined with the definition of game-theoretic probability:
Corollary 1 Suppose the game of forecasting bounded variables lasts a fixed
number N of rounds. If all an and bn are given in advance and t > 0 is a
known constant, the upper probability of the event
1
N
N∑
n=1
(xn − µn) ≥ t (3)
does not exceed
e−2N
2t2/C ,
where C :=
∑N
n=1(bn − an)
2.
(The reader will see that it is sufficient for Sceptic to know only C at the start
of the game, not the individual an and bn.)
Proof The supermartingale of Theorem 1 starts from 1 and achieves
N∏
n=1
exp
(
h(xn − µn)−
h2
8
(bn − an)
2
)
≥ exp
(
hNt−
h2
8
C
)
(4)
on the event (3). The right-hand side of (4) attains its maximum at h := 4Nt/C,
which gives the statement of the corollary.
Remark The measure-theoretic counterpart of Corollary 1 is sometimes re-
ferred to as the Hoeffding–Azuma inequality, in honour of Kazuoki Azuma [1].
The martingale version, however, is also stated in Hoeffding’s paper ([2], the
end of Section 2).
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